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WHY “LIVE-AND-LET-LIVE” IS NOT A 
VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE DIFFICULT 
PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS 
ACCOMMODATION IN THE AGE OF 
SEXUAL CIVIL RIGHTS 
MARY ANNE CASE* 
For the better part of a decade, a number of well-intentioned scholars 
of religious liberty have insisted that, as Douglas Laycock put it, 
“conflicts . . . between religious conservatives and the gay rights 
movement[] have live-and-let-live solutions in the tradition of American 
liberty.”1 More recently, some have tried to concretize this general claim in 
 
 *. Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. This essay was 
developed as part of my contribution to the 2014 Harvard Law School/Williams Institute/ACLU/USC 
Conference on Religious Accommodation in the Age of Civil Rights; to a 2009 conference convened  
by UCLA’s Williams Institute and Princeton’s James Madison Program; to a 2014 conference on 
Religion, Rights and Institutions at Princeton; and, to a lesser extent, as part of my 2013 participation in 
Stanford Law School’s Marriage Equality conference and the Politics of Religious Freedom Capstone 
Workshop at Northwestern University, in a 2015 University of Chicago Law School workshop, and at 
the 2015 Petrie-Flom Conference on Law, Religion, and Health in America.  I am grateful to the 
organizers and participants in those events, many of whom are individually thanked below. Particular 
thanks are due for comments on drafts by Rick Garnett, Todd Henderson, Doug NeJaime, Alan Patten, 
Winni Sullivan and Laura Weinrib; the help of Will Baude, David Dunn Bauer, Tom Berg, Jennifer 
Drobac, Chai Feldblum, Ben Finkelstein, Mary Anne Franks, Fred Gedicks, Robby George, Nicole 
Goldstein, Josh Gutoff, Dick Helmholz, Nan Hunter, Cathleen Kaveny, Andy Koppelman, Doug 
Laycock, Saul Levmore, Rachel Leiser Levy, Chris Lund, Chip Lupu, Linda McClain, Sara McDougall, 
Louise Melling, Michael Moreland, Cliff Rosky, Kim Lane Scheppele, Robin Fretwell Wilson, and 
Kenji Yoshino; for the research assistance of Rachel Bukberg, Lyo Louis-Jacques, Marlow Svatek, Tara 
Tavernia, and Kira Wilpone-Jordan; and for the support of the Kanter fund. 
 1. Douglas Laycock, McElroy Lecture: Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 429–30 (2011) [hereinafter Laycock, Free Exercise]. In addition to the 
Spring 2014 Harvard Law School/UCLA Williams Institute/USC conference on Religious 
Accommodation in the Age of Civil Rights to which this Essay is my contribution, at least two other 
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more-or-less specific proposals for accommodation of religious objectors in 
the context of state laws recognizing same-sex marriage.2 In no small part 
because of continuing religious conscientious objection to abortion and 
newly vigorous religious objection to contraception,3 including but not 
 
conferences of which I am aware tackled the question of what such solutions might look like. The first, 
organized in 2005 under the auspices of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, produced an influential 
conference volume, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas 
Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008). The second, co-sponsored by 
Princeton’s James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions and the Williams Institute in 
late 2009, was convened to discuss the question presented in a 2008 draft proposal, Andrew Koppelman 
& George W. Dent, Must Gay Rights Conflict With Religious Liberty? (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author), a question the authors sought to persuade participants could be answered in the 
negative. Each of these conferences dampened to some extent their chief proponents’ optimism. In his 
Afterword to the 2008 volume, Laycock conceded that the essays in it “ma[d]e clear, to an extent that I 
had not appreciated, that some of this conflict is unavoidable.” Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra, at 189, 192. And the critique 
of Koppelman and Dent’s 2008 proposal was sufficient to cause them to abandon it. But Koppelman 
arrived at the 2014 Harvard conference with a retooled proposal, see Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, 
Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619 
(2015), while Laycock continues to “believe that we can protect liberty and equality for both sides of 
this conflict” despite acknowledging increasing frustration at what he sees as the apparent lack of 
willingness on the part of either side to cooperate in a solution. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and 
the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 840 [hereinafter Laycock, Culture Wars]. That much of my 
critique in this Essay centers on Laycock and, to a lesser extent, on Koppelman, derives in part from 
their prominence and influence, but also from the fortuity that I was charged at the 2009 Princeton 
conference with responding to Koppelman’s proposal and was on a panel at the 2014 Harvard 
conference with Laycock, who there presented an abbreviated version of what shortly thereafter was 
published as Culture Wars.  
 2. See, e.g., Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Thomas C. Berg, Richard W. Garnett, Carl H. 
Esbeck & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Religious Liberty Implications of Legalizing Same-Sex 
Marriage, House Bill No. 75 [Delaware] (May 1, 2013) [hereinafter Letter from Wilson et al.], 
available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/delaware-letter.pdf) (presenting and urging passage of 
draft accommodation legislation); Letter from Douglas Laycock et al., SB 0010 Religious Liberty 
Implications of Same-Sex Marriage [Illinois] (Mar. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Letter from Laycock et al.], 
available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/illinois-republicans-2013.pdf (urging adoption of 
proposals for religious exemption made in a letter earlier submitted by “a group of scholars led by 
Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson”). Mirror of Justice collects all the letters the group, including Wilson 
and Berg, has sent proposing state legislation to a variety of states and all the letters a group headed by 
Laycock has sent to the same states urging passage of the draft legislation, see Thomas Berg, Archive: 
Memos/Letters on Religious Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage, MIRROR JUST. (Aug. 2, 2009), 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-
samesex-marriage.html. 
 3. I describe these objections to the provision of contraception as newly vigorous because, until 
the contraception mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) publicized and 
crystallized the issue for them, many religious employers who now demand exemptions had quietly 
been providing to their employees exactly the contraception to which these employers now object, 
either through alleged inadvertence or under state law and prior court order. Thus, Hobby Lobby 
claimed to be unaware it had been making available to its employees prescriptions for Plan B and ella, 
two drugs to which it claimed a religious objection before the United States Supreme Court, until this 
was drawn to its attention in a review of its insurance policies incident to a Becket Fund inquiry into the 
possibility of the company’s participating in a challenge to the ACA. See, e.g., Katie Sanders, Did 
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limited to demands for exemptions from the contraception mandate of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)4 such as those 
recently considered by the Supreme Court in cases like Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby,5 some of these scholars have now expanded the reach of their 
proposals for religious accommodation from the narrow issue of same-sex 
marriage6 to more broad “disagreements over sexual morality.”7 In this 
broader context, they renew their claims, first, that to arrive at a live-and-
 
Hobby Lobby Once Provide the Birth Control Coverage it Sued the Obama Administration Over?, 
POLITIFACT (July 1, 2014, 1:02 PM), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/jul/01/sally-
kohn/did-hobby-lobby-once-provide-birth-control-coverag/. And Catholic Charities had litigated and 
lost cases under New York and California law, which denied it a religious exemption from an employer 
mandate to provide prescription contraception as a matter of sex equality. See Catholic Charities of 
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 73 (Cal. 2004) (denying “church-affiliated employer's 
constitutional challenges to [California’s] Women's Contraception Equity Act . . . , under which certain 
health and disability insurance contracts must cover prescription contraceptives”); Catholic Charities of 
the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 461 (N.Y. 2006) (denying constitutional challenge to 
legislative decision to allow certain church-affiliated employers and not others an exemption from those 
provisions of New York’s Women’s Health and Wellness Act “requiring that an employer health 
insurance contract which provides coverage for prescription drugs shall include coverage for the cost of 
contraceptive drugs or devices” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Some Catholic institutions in New 
York continued to provide employees prescription contraceptives even though the N.Y. Court of 
Appeals had observed that the law offered another option, “surely not impossible, though it may be 
expensive or difficult, to compensate employees adequately without including prescription drugs in 
their group health care policies.” Id. at 468. See, e.g., Joseph Berger & Thomas Kaplan, N.Y. Law on 
Contraceptives Already in Place, and Catholic Institutions Comply, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/11/nyregion/catholic-institutions-reluctantly-comply-with-ny-
contraceptives-law.html (noting that while “[s]ome New York Catholic institutions—including the 
Archdiocese of New York . . . chose to self-insure rather than pay for contraception after New York 
State adopted a requirement in 2002 that any insurance policy with a prescription drug benefit provide 
coverage for birth control. . . . [other] Catholic institutions now offer health insurance plans that include 
contraceptive drugs among the services they cover for employees and students, though with caveats.” 
such as the exclusion of “‘drugs that induce abortion, sterilization or services relating to the restoration 
of fertility’”). 
 4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 5. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that plaintiff closely 
held for-profit corporations were entitled to an exemption under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993 (“RFRA”) from the contraception mandate of the ACA). See also, Little Sisters of the Poor 
Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 (2014) (mem.) (enjoining government from 
requiring a religious non-profit requesting an ACA exemption to “use the form prescribed by the 
Government and . . . send copies to third-party administrators”); Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 
2806 (2014) (similar). 
 6. Others, such as Wilson, began by proposing religious accommodation in the context of 
reproductive rights before turning attention to same-sex marriage. See generally, Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 1, at 77 (arguing that 
legislative accommodation models developed for religious objection to abortion should be adapted by 
religious objectors to same-sex marriage). 
 7. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 846. Laycock cites specifically disagreements about 
“abortion, contraception, emergency contraception, sterilization, gay rights, and same-sex marriage.” Id. 
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let-live solution8 is not only desirable but possible “if we have the will to 
do so,”9 and second, that to do otherwise than accommodate would be 
untrue to this nation’s tradition of religious liberty.10 
This Essay will sharply contest both of these claims with respect not 
so much to their normative desirability as to their descriptive accuracy. 
Even when the claim for a win-win, live-and-let-live solution is limited to 
same-sex marriage or to gay rights more generally, ever since I first 
seriously engaged with this claim more than five years ago,11 I have been 
profoundly skeptical as a descriptive matter that such a solution could be 
concretely constructed, let alone successfully implemented. In part, this is 
because, as I shall discuss below, proponents of accommodations they 
claimed were designed to live-and-let-live initially tended to 
isolate issues of gay rights without ever even 
acknowledging that they are far from the only issues as 
 
 8. In a field as rife with acronyms as is religious accommodation law, among them the 
unpronounceable RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.) and 
RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.), 
I thought seriously about referring throughout this Essay to proposals to live-and-let-live as “LALL” 
but decided that repeated verbal clarity as to what was being claimed trumped saving a few syllables. 
 9. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 840.  
 10. Just as space limitations foreclose me from setting out below any of my own arguments in 
the detail they would require to be fully convincing, they also force me to lump together under the 
umbrella of “live-and-let-live” a number of scholars, each of whom has his or her own nuanced view of 
what religious accommodations are possible and desirable and why. To the extent I am aware of 
differences that matter to my arguments herein, and to the extent space permits, I do my best to note 
them. 
 11. I have, of course, been thinking and writing about religious reaction to same-sex marriage 
claims for far longer than five years. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
1758, 1792–97 (2005) (analyzing the effect of the conflation of religious and civil marriage in the 
United States on the stakes for Protestants in the same-sex marriage debates). In 2009, however, I was 
asked to prepare a comment for the Princeton symposium, see supra note 1, on Koppelman and Dent’s 
draft, “Must Gay Rights Conflict With Religious Liberty?” and, like most of the others asked to 
comment, was so critical of the proposal that my announced aim of having Koppelman withdraw it 
succeeded. At about that same time, I was also publishing the first fruits of my feminist fundamentalism 
project, discussed further infra, see Mary Anne Case, Perfectionism and Fundamentalism in the 
Application of the German Abortion Laws, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93 (Susan H. Williams ed., 2009); Mary Anne Case, Feminist 
Fundamentalism and Constitutional Citizenship, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S 
EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 107 (Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009) [hereinafter Feminist 
Fundamentalism and Constitutional Citizenship]; Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the 
Frontier Between Government and Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 381, each 
of which gave some attention to the relationship between claims for religious exemption and claims for 
sex equality and sexual and reproductive rights. I was also, while drafting what became Mary Anne 
Case, A Lot To Ask: Review Essay of Martha Nussbaum’s From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual 
Orientation and Constitutional Law, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 89 (2010) [hereinafter Case, A Lot to 
Ask], engaging with my colleague Martha Nussbaum’s somewhat different approach to the competing 
claims of religion and gay rights. 
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to which there is strong religiously motivated objection, 
let alone discussing the extent to which [their] proposed 
framework should be or the reasons why it should not be 
applied to any of these other issues.12 
One of the fears I announced in 200913 has indeed come to pass—the 
insistent claim for religious accommodation has in the intervening years 
extended far beyond gay rights to other sexual rights, other reproductive 
and family recognition rights, and women’s rights.14 I have a strong 
personal normative stake in fighting this expansion,15 committed as I am to 
what I have called feminist fundamentalism,16 defined in my case as an 
uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes and to the 
abolition of fixed sex roles. But my principal focus in this Essay will 
remain on the practical and legal, not the ideological problems with this 
expansion.17 In particular, as I shall discuss, this expansion of claims for 
accommodation does not solve, but rather compounds, the problem of 
selective attention to only a subset of the laws and regulations to which 
religiously motivated actors might have a conscientious objection. 
 
 12. Memorandum from Mary Anne Case to Andrew Koppelman and George Dent at 1 (Dec. 4, 
2009) [hereinafter Memo to Koppelman and Dent] (on file with author) (circulated in preparation for 
the Princeton Conference described supra note 1 to discuss Koppelman and Dent’s proposal for 
religious accommodation in the context of gay rights). 
 13.  See id. at 10 (“Whether under the Equal Pay Act or Title VII, numerous employers have 
litigated and lost their claim that their religious views justified them in refusing to hire or promote 
women or to pay them equally with men. Would your proposal not only upset this settled law but 
expand the range of employers who could use religious exemptions to discriminate against women?” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 14. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 15. I readily concede my strong personal stake in these issues, but find it equally worthy of note 
that neither Koppelman nor Laycock has a similarly strong stake—they are neither devout nor gay nor 
female. It is a lot easier to endorse compromise when you have no dog of your own in the fight, nor ox 
to be gored. By contrast, even with respect to same-sex marriage, I am not merely an ally of lesbians 
and gay men; as a feminist fundamentalist, I have a direct personal stake in “genderless marriage.” 
 16. For my definition of feminist fundamentalism and an exploration of its many analogies to 
religious commitments, see generally Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism as an Individual and 
Constitutional Commitment, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 549, 550 (2011) (defining feminist 
fundamentalism as “an uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes as intense and at least 
as worthy of respect as, for example, a religiously or culturally based commitment to female 
subordination or fixed sex roles”). 
 17. I also do not take on the normative question of live-and-let-live as a guiding principle. While, 
at an abstract level, this principal is endorsed even by Pope Francis, who listed it as number one in his 
“top 10 secrets to happiness,” my point is that the devil remains in the details. See Carol Glatz, In Latest 
Interview, Pope Francis Reveals Top 10 Secrets to Happiness, CATHOLIC NEWS SERV. (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/1403144.htm (“‘Live and let live.’ Everyone should be 
guided by this principle, he said, which has a similar expression in Rome with the saying, ‘Move 
forward and let others do the same.’”). 
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As Laycock acknowledges, “[m]ost religious liberty issues actually 
have nothing to do with sex, or abortion, or nonbelievers.”18 His point in 
acknowledging this fact is to highlight what he sees as a serious risk that 
the insistent demands by conservative religiously motivated actors for 
accommodation in the culture wars may “erod[e] support for religious 
liberty” among Americans more generally in the future.19 As I shall 
explain, among my central concerns are two different ones: first, there are 
serious problems under both the Establishment Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause if only a certain subset of religious claims for 
exemption—those propounded largely by conservative Christians in 
conflict with laws guaranteeing liberty and equality in matters of sex, 
gender, and sexuality—are favorably received; and second, there would be 
even more serious problems with administrability, of the sort Justice 
Antonin Scalia warned of in his opinion for the Court in Employment 
Division v. Smith,20 if an even broader set of religious accommodation 
 
 18. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 877. 
 19. Id. As he did in response to my remarks at the 2014 Harvard conference, see supra note 1, 
Laycock often vehemently asserts that those who oppose accommodations targeted to favor the 
religiously motivated opponents of sexual rights favor abolishing religious liberty. See, e.g. Harvard 
Law School, Religious Accommodation Conference: Complexifying Accommodation in Anti-
Discrimination Law (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfaOp0lZinU (59:20–1:00:45). 
This is a profoundly misguided accusation. Few, if any, sane persons are categorically in favor of either 
religious or sexual liberty. Speaking for myself, whether I support liberty under law for either religious 
or sexual practices depends profoundly on the nature of the practice—I oppose rape and suttee; I 
support adults who wish to engage in consensual sex and those who, for religious reasons, decline 
remarriage after the death of a spouse. It should also be clear that the deeply religious are now and have 
always been on both sides of the sexual culture wars. The Women's Division of the Board of Global 
Ministries of the United Methodist Church was among the plaintiffs in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980), seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Hyde Amendment and have the government pay for the 
medically necessary abortions of poor women. And numerous churches not only support same-sex 
marriage, but have gone into court to vindicate their right to have the same-sex marriages recognized by 
their faith tradition also recognized by secular law. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, The Peculiar Stake U.S. 
Protestants Have in the Question of State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, in AFTER SECULAR LAW 
302, 311 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011) (describing arguments made in pro-same-sex 
marriage amicus briefs by, inter alia, the United Church of Christ). It is worth considering, however, 
how few persons and organizations not motivated by religious conviction are now fighting the sexual 
culture wars on the side of opposition to LGBT, women’s, and reproductive rights. Moreover, it would 
be a mistake to characterize the legal aspect of the sexual culture wars as lining up religious history and 
tradition unequivocally on one side and newfangled egalitarian women’s and gay liberationists on the 
other. After all, it was the Puritans who gave us civil marriage. They prohibited ministers from even 
attending, let alone performing the ceremony. For further discussion, see Case, Marriage Licenses, 
supra note 11, at 1796–97. 
 20. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990) (“The rule 
respondents favor [mandating an exemption from generally applicable criminal laws, such as those 
prohibiting use of controlled substances, for those with a religious reason for engaging in the prohibited 
conduct] would open the prospect of . . . required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost 
every conceivable kind—ranging from compulsory military service, to the payment of taxes; to health 
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claims is given traction. 
This Essay thus rests on the normative view that Smith was correctly 
decided and that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)21 was a 
mistake, even if for no other reason, then because of the descriptive 
impracticability of an approach to religious exemptions from generally 
applicable law contrary to that of the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith, as the 
Court explained when it first squarely confronted the issue in Reynolds v. 
United States:22 
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with 
practices. . . . [To permit] a man [to] excuse his practices to the contrary 
because of his religious belief . . . would be to make the professed 
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect 
to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could 
exist only in name under such circumstances.23 
Not only in (in)famous cases like Reynolds and Smith, but also in 
somewhat less notorious ones like Estate of Thornton v. Caldor24 and 
United States v. Lee,25 and in regrettably nearly forgotten ones like 
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California,26 which this Essay will 
review, the Supreme Court repeatedly set forth convincing arguments why 
the sorts of religious exemptions from generally applicable laws typically 
 
and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug 
laws, and traffic laws; to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws, 
animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing for equality of opportunity for 
the races.” (citations omitted)) 
 21. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq (2012). 
 22. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 23. Id. at 166–67. 
 24. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709–11 (1985) (striking down as a violation of 
the Establishment Clause a state statute giving employees an “absolute and unqualified right not to 
work on their Sabbath,” because, among other defects, “the statute takes no account of the convenience 
or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath”). See also 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C. 1966) (“Undoubtedly 
defendant . . . has a constitutional right to espouse the religious beliefs of his own choosing, however, 
he does not have the absolute right to exercise and practice such beliefs in utter disregard of the clear 
constitutional rights of other citizens. This Court refuses to lend credence or support to his position that 
he has a constitutional right to refuse to serve members of the Negro race in his business establishments 
upon the ground that to do so would violate his sacred religious beliefs.”), aff’d in relevant part and 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d and modified on other grounds, 390 
U.S. 400 (1968). 
 25. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting free exercise claim by Amish employer 
seeking exemption from Social Security tax laws). 
 26. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (upholding a requirement that 
students at a state school take a course in military science and tactics, despite students’ religious 
objections). 
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proposed by proponents of a live-and-let-live solution to the sexual culture 
wars are neither workable nor “in the tradition of American liberty.”27 
It is noteworthy that not even with respect to the concrete proposals 
for religious exemption they have actually endorsed, let alone with respect 
to the host of comparable claims for accommodation foreseeably waiting in 
the wings, have the proponents of live-and-let-live set forth in any detail 
how the proposed religious accommodations they urge legislatures and 
courts to adopt would actually work in practice.28 
This lack of detail is not the only respect in which, as a descriptive 
 
 27. Laycock, Free Exercise, supra note 1, at 429–30. 
 28. If there is a fully detailed proposal out there I have missed, I would welcome access to it. As 
things stand, I have personally asked for details from many of the more prominent advocates of live-
and-let-live solutions and received to date either no response or a frank acknowledgement that many of 
the details remain to be worked out. Nothing I have seen walks through the elements of an exemption 
case, including who has the burden of production and of proof of what, especially if the law provides an 
accommodation only if there is an alternative provider reasonably available. These sorts of details 
should matter to the conscientious objector, since, for example, small businesses would want to know 
what sort of risk they are assuming when they decline service. For example, is it incumbent on the 
provider to inquire up front, before taking an order, whether the service might be objectionable? If no 
upfront inquiry is made, but the provider learns before performance that, for example, the flowers are 
for a same-sex wedding, is breach then permissible? Does the provider have the burden of specifying 
the reasonable alternative? If so, when—at the time of refusal or only in court? If the provider does bear 
the burden of identifying an alternative at the time of refusal of service, this in itself may pose a 
problem for the provider’s conscience. If the provider does not have the obligation to offer an 
alternative, what is the burden on the customer? How many other providers does s/he have to locate and 
try to do business with and how fungible does their service have to be in terms of either price or quality 
or accessibility? Is having to run through a dozen refusals before finding a willing provider enough to 
meet the exemptions requirement of no readily available substitute? If the customer has no car does it 
matter that there’s no other provider in walking distance? If the customer has no Internet access, does it 
matter that there’s no other provider in the local phone book? If the service is a custom service, will an 
off-the-rack alternative do? How much does it matter if the service is a luxury good like a wedding cake 
or a necessity like emergency medical care? (There certainly are cases in the abortion context where 
women refused by one hospital suffered grave health consequences on their way to another one; 
similarly, with respect to the morning-after pill, every hour that goes by after intercourse and before 
access to it decreases its effectiveness.) 
  In the case of a general exemption which by its terms depends on there being an adequate 
substitute provider, one cannot simply assume there will be a thick market for services. One first has to 
define, in each very particular case, what constitutes a sufficiently thick market and then establish that 
such a market does exist in that particular case. Were I a lawyer advising a would-be conscientious 
objector who was only prepared to refuse service if s/he would be legally protected in doing so, I 
honestly would not know what exactly the conditions on the ground would have to be to ensure a safe 
harbor. I am not claiming these sorts of practical questions are unanswerable; I am merely suggesting 
that the fact that every proponent of exemptions I have talked to acknowledges s/he has not developed 
an answer for them should give one serious pause before adopting an exemption proposal.  
  For some additional sense of the potential problems with working out the details, see 
generally Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption from Antidiscrimination Laws in the 
Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions For Those Who Discriminate Against Married or 
Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173 (2012).  
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matter, it can fairly be said that no viable live-and-let-live solution is 
currently on the table. Although the claim of the proponents of living-and-
letting-live is that “we can and should protect the liberty of both sides in 
the culture wars,”29 every proposal I have seen provides far more protection 
to the religious objectors than to the proponents of sexual liberty and 
equality, among which latter group I unequivocally count myself. In 
particular, while it is clearly correct to say, as Laycock does, that, “[i]f we 
are to preserve liberty for both sides in the culture wars, then we have to 
preserve some space where each side can live its own values and where its 
rules control,”30 no proposal I yet have seen offers my side in the culture 
wars anything like the “space . . . [to] live its own values and where its 
rules control”31 such proposals insist our conservative religious opponents 
are entitled to. As a strong supporter of rights to sexual liberty and equality, 
I instead observe that many religiously motivated opponents of such rights 
seem to want to have their cake, eat it too, and shove it down my throat; 
and that most, if not all, religious liberty scholars who claim their goal is a 
live-and-let-live solution seem to support my religious opponents in their 
ongoing efforts to realize these desires at my expense. 
Here are some of the descriptive claims I am seeking to encapsulate 
with this admittedly tendentiously formulated imagery: 
First, as proponents of living-and-letting-live themselves have to 
admit,32 few conservative participants in the sexual culture wars showed 
any interest in settling for accommodation so long as there was any chance 
of complete victory for their side.33 Most religious objectors to, for 
example, same-sex marriage, began with (and many still retain) a 
 
 29. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 839. 
 30. Id. at 876. See also Koppelman, supra note 1, at 626 (“Both gay people and religious 
conservatives seek space in society wherein they can live out their beliefs, values, and identities.”). 
 31. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 876. 
 32. See, e.g., Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 879 (“The religious side persists in trying 
to regulate other people's sex lives and relationships so long as it thinks it has any chance of success.”).  
 33. One exception may be Douglas Kmiec, who, as early as 2009, in the immediate aftermath of 
the passage of Proposition 8, co-wrote an editorial urging California to abolish state-sponsored marriage 
entirely and substitute a civil union status open to couples of any sex. See Douglas W. Kmiec & Shelley 
Ross Saxer, Equality in Substance and in Name, S.F. GATE, Mar. 2, 2009, at A13, available at 
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/03/02/EDFU166H0A.DTL. Even this offer of a live-
and-let-live compromise, however, sought to create an advantageous monopoly for religion by taking 
the use of the word “marriage” away from the public sphere (and hence from the proponents of sexual 
liberty and equality,  who include not only same-sex marriage proponents but also opponents of the 
notion that it was a wife’s duty “graciously to submit to her husband’s . . . leadership”). Cf. Case, supra 
note 19, at 318 (discussing privatization and formalization by the Southern Baptists of marital doctrines 
of female subordination they could previously use state law to enforce, but which had been taken 
constitutionally out of bounds for the state by the late twentieth century).  
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perfectionist impulse to enshrine as secular law and enforce against their 
opponents their own religious views;34 they only began to retreat from 
perfectionism into claims of uncompromising conscientious objection35 
once they saw themselves on the losing end of the culture war.36 
Second, religious objectors in the U.S. have been increasingly 
successful in recent years at obtaining unprecedentedly robust 
constitutional and statutory protection for enclaves in which they can “live 
[their] own values and [have their] rules control”37 despite the contrary 
commands of secular laws specifically designed to protect the liberty and 
equality of their opponents in the culture wars. Among these enclaves, as 
discussed below, are not only (A) churches themselves and institutions 
sponsored by or affiliated with them, but (B) for-profit corporations and 
perhaps also (C) units of local government. 
(A) The first Supreme Court case ever to hold that religious 
institutions were constitutionally entitled to an exemption from civil rights 
laws was Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
 
 34. Consider, for example, the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), the many state mini-
DOMAs both statutory and constitutional; the failed federal marriage amendment; the Proposition 8 
campaign, which evidence at trial in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 955 (N.D. Cal. 
2010), indicated was largely financed, staffed and passed by religious opponents of same-sex marriage; 
and the unusually direct demands by religious leaders that their faithful vote against same-sex 
relationship recognition, such as the DVD with a message stressing the need for a constitutional 
amendment to ban same-sex marriage in Minnesota mailed by Minneapolis archbishop John Nienstedt 
to the homes of more than 400,000 Minnesota Catholics just before the November elections in 2010. 
See, e.g. Case, supra note 19, at 309. Many of the state mini-DOMAs prohibited not only marriage, but 
also any other form of state relationship recognition for same-sex couples, whose sexual activities many 
conservative religious groups wanted to see remain criminalized in the half-century leading up to 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down state law criminalizing homosexual sex). 
 35. I am invoking here a distinction between perfectionism (defined as a willingness to impose 
on others) and fundamentalism (defined as an unwillingness to compromise oneself) I developed in the 
course of my project on feminist fundamentalism. For a discussion of this distinction, see, for instance, 
Case, supra note 16, at 550–53; for an application of it to religious opponents of same-sex and of 
egalitarian marriage, see, for instance Case, supra note 19, at 317. As I explained in Feminist 
Fundamentalism, supra note 16, with respect to any given commitment or set of commitments, one can 
be either a perfectionist, a fundamentalist, both or neither. One can decide one will not compromise 
without wishing to impose or that one wishes to impose and, in the interests of that imposition, 
compromise. I am well aware of the danger of using a term with many meanings like “fundamentalist” 
or even “perfectionist” in this context, but I must insist that I am carefully using these terms only as I 
have defined them herein. 
 36. I would say to them what I said to clients in my years as a corporate litigator: you can’t 
expect to get, after a trial in which you lost, the same settlement you might have been offered before 
trial. Now that the Supreme Court will squarely face the constitutional question of same-sex marriage in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the religious right has lost much of its chance to propose compromise on 
recognition of same-sex marriage. 
 37. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 876. 
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,38 a case Laycock briefed and 
argued in the Supreme Court on behalf of the prevailing religious entity, 
part of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, a strong conservative voice 
in the sexual culture wars.39 Although the law at issue in the case was the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),40 the sexual culture wars 
nevertheless played a central role at oral argument, with Justices from both 
the left and the right of the Court and even the advocate for the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), taking it as a central and 
legitimate premise in support of the “ministerial exception” to the 
employment discrimination laws that “[t]he government’s general interest 
in eradicating discrimination in the workplace is simply not sufficient to 
justify changing the way that the Catholic Church chooses its priests [or 
other authority figures], based on gender roles that are rooted in religious 
doctrine.”41 More broadly, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for a unanimous 
court in Hosanna-Tabor has the potential to become what I have called 
 
 38. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
132 S. Ct. 694, 699 (2012) (holding that “the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment bar” employment discrimination lawsuits “when the employer is a religious group and the 
employee is one of the group’s ministers,” with the result being what had come to be known as the 
“ministerial exception”). 
 39. See Family, Marriage and Human Sexuality FAQs, LUTHERAN CHURCH—MISSOURI SYNOD, 
http://www.lcms.org/faqs/lcmsviews#family (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). The Lutheran Church—
Missouri Synod has filed a number of amicus briefs in sexual culture wars cases before the Court. See, 
e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Evangelicals et al. in Support of Petitioners at 4, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2012 WL 3864341, at *4 (opposing the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision to strike down Proposition 8—“a state constitutional amendment providing that 
‘[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California’”); Brief for Focus on 
the Family et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents and Cross-Petitioners, Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 12006412 at *6 (supporting 
Pennsylvania’s spousal notice provision for certain abortions). 
 40. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2012). 
 41. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 
WL 4593953, at *32. The language quoted in text was the response of Justice Department attorney 
Leondra R. Kruger to Justice Breyer’s statement: “So the fact if they want to choose to the priest, you 
could go to the Catholic Church and say they have to be women. I mean, you couldn't say that. That's 
obvious. So how are you distinguishing this?” See id. at 31–32. See also, e.g., id. at 43–44 (colloquy 
between Justice Alito and Ms. Kruger on the need for deference to the Catholic Church were it to claim 
that a female professor should not be tenured in canon law).. It is worthy of note that, in a 
disproportionate number of the prominent lower court cases holding that there was a ministerial 
exemption to the laws guaranteeing equal employment opportunity, the plaintiff whose claim was 
excluded by the ministerial exception was a woman or a gay man suing a religious organization that 
openly objected to full equality on grounds of sex or sexual orientation. Thus, Justice Alito’s example 
of a “nun . . . [who] wanted a tenured position teaching canon law at Catholic University 
and . . . claimed that she was denied tenure . . . because of her gender” was, as he said, “a real case,” id. 
at 43. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(holding that the ministerial exception applied to a tenured professorship in canon law and dismissing 
the Title VII claim of Sister Elizabeth McDonough). 
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“Citizens of the City of God United,”42 eviscerating the holding in Smith 
and ceding to religious institutions a constitutionally protected sphere of 
liberty they have never before enjoyed under U.S. law.43 
(B) While the Justices in Hosanna-Tabor took discrimination in 
employment on grounds of sex as the paradigm case of what churches must 
be protected in doing if they so choose, the majority in Hobby Lobby and 
its progeny took government protection of women’s reproductive freedom 
and equality, another centerpiece of the sexual culture wars, as the 
paradigm case of what might be trumped by religious objectors claiming a 
right to accommodation under RFRA.44 
(C) There remains comparatively little discussion today among 
supporters of a live-and-let-live solution to the sexual culture wars of 
having the spaces in which the respective sides can “live [their] own values 
and [have their] rules control” truly public spaces,45 that is to say, units of 
government from the level of the county or city all the way up to the state 
into which people would be encouraged to self-sort.46 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions have not only declared church space to 
 
 42. The reference is, of course, to Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the controversial 
case in which the Supreme Court overruled previously upheld limitations on the speech and political 
expenditures of corporations. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, Citizens of the City of God 
United? The Confused Premises and Radical Implications of Hosanna Tabor (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the author). In my view, the Roberts opinion in Hosanna-Tabor is another major example 
of the corporatist turn in Supreme Court jurisprudence, and of Chief Justice Roberts’s tendency to plant 
a seed in an opinion fully cognizant, as his colleagues may not be, of the great oak of legal change he 
expects to spring from it. In addition to explicating this view, my manuscript analyzes the problems 
from the perspectives both of religious and of secular law with Roberts’s unprecedented innovative 
alternate history of the Religion Clauses and the alternative vision it represents.  
 43. For evidence that religious institutions were under much tighter control under secular law in 
earlier times in the U.S., see generally Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on 
Church Power and Property Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (2014) (providing examples 
of the limits state law placed on religious organizations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).  
 44. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014) (“[O]ur 
decision in these cases is concerned solely with the contraceptive mandate. Our decision should not be 
understood to hold that an insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an 
employer's religious beliefs. Other coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be supported by 
different interests (for example, the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve 
different arguments about the least restrictive means of providing them.”)  
 45. See Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 876. 
 46. There are, of course, religiously-motivated opponents of same-sex marriage still arguing for a 
federalism-based solution in which states could choose whether or not to recognize same-sex marriage. 
But the October 2014 actions by the Supreme Court denying certiorari, dissolving stays, and thereby 
clearing the way for same-sex marriages in at least an additional sixteen states as a matter of federal 
constitutional right on top of the nineteen states in which same-sex marriage had already been made 
available under state law, makes this an almost certainly lost cause. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court 
Delivers Tacit Win to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/10/07/us/denying-review-justices-clear-way-for-gay-marriage-in-5-states.html. 
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be newly inviolable and private corporate space to be newly protected for 
the religious, but they have also vastly increased the ability of the religious 
to exert control over public governmental space47 and resources.48 
While conservative religious individuals and institutions insist on the 
freedom to exclude and discriminate against their opponents in the sexual 
culture wars (including, but not limited to, openly lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender persons, and heterosexuals to whose sexual, marital, or 
reproductive choices they claim to have religious objections), they, and the 
proponents of live-and-let-live solutions who support them in their 
 
 47. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (sustaining, against an 
Establishment Clause challenge, a municipality’s practice of opening town board meetings with prayer, 
frequently including sectarian Christian prayer). Although Laycock represented the losing side in this 
case pro bono, his objection was limited to the sectarian character of the prayer. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 31, Id. (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5939896, at *31 (response by Laycock in oral argument 
stating that “[w]e’re saying you cannot have sectarian prayer”). Shortly after the Supreme Court 
decision in its favor, and contrary to representations relied on by the Court, the town of Greece 
announced it would be limiting eligibility to deliver prayers at town meetings to “individuals who 
represent ‘assemblies with an established presence in the town of Greece that regularly meet for the 
primary purpose of sharing a religious perspective’” and “‘leader[s]’ or ‘appointed representative[s]’ of 
religious assemblies from outside the town of Greece,” at least one of whose members resides in Greece 
and “specifically asks in writing.” Dahlia Lithwick, Checking In on the Town of Greece, SLATE (Aug. 
27 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/the_town_of_ 
greece_s_new_prayer_policy_atheists_need_not_apply.html. 
 48. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 592–93 (2008) (denying 
taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause to challenge use by George W. Bush’s White House 
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives of funds appropriated for the general discretionary use 
of the Executive Branch for conferences promoting “the efficacy of faith-based programs in delivering 
social services”); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (denying taxpayer 
standing under the Establishment Clause to challenge tax credits offered by a state to those who 
contributed to scholarship funds for sectarian schools that discriminated in admission on the basis of 
religion). Laycock filed an amicus brief in Arizona Christian on behalf of religious organizations, 
including the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, opposing the challenge to tax credits for 
contributions to sectarian schools. Brief Amici Curaie of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
et al. in Support of Petitioners, Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1436 (Nos. 09-987, 09-991), 2010 WL 
3535061. Indeed, if Laycock and other prominent proponents of live-and-let-live solutions to the sexual 
culture wars had had their way, religious institutions and individuals would have, as a matter of 
constitutional right, an even greater claim on governmental resources. For example, although the 
Supreme Court ultimately ruled in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), that the state of Washington 
was permitted to exclude from an otherwise open college scholarship program otherwise qualified 
applicants who were pursuing a degree in devotional theology, Thomas C. Berg and Laycock had filed 
an amicus brief in the case on behalf of several consortia of religiously-affiliated colleges and several 
active conservative religious participants in the sexual culture wars (including the Family Research 
Council, Focus on the Family, and the Christian Legal Society) arguing that Washington’s exclusion of 
devotional theology alone from its list of majors qualified for scholarship support was “flagrant and 
facial discrimination against religious activity and religious viewpoints violat[ive of] both the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause.” Brief Amici Curiae of the Council for Christian Colls. & 
Univs. et al. in Support of Respondent at 1, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 
WL 22176102, at *1. 
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demands to exclude, simultaneously insist that individuals and institutions 
committed to sexual equality and liberty should not be permitted to exclude 
or discriminate against, and indeed should be forced to accommodate and 
subsidize religious applicants who do not share and wish to be exempted 
from facilitating an institution’s commitments to, for example, LGBT 
equality, the equality of the sexes or reproductive rights. As the examples 
discussed below will demonstrate, the proposal to live-and-let-live is 
radically asymmetrical, with religious opponents of sexual rights 
demanding both legal protection for their own space and the legal right to 
invade the space of their opponents. 
Moreover, this insistence on nondiscrimination against and 
nonexclusion of religious opponents of sexual rights extends to an 
insistence that their access to government recognition and government 
funding be unimpeded, even when the reason government gives for 
declining recognition and funding is the religious organization’s or 
individual’s discriminatory policies with respect to sex, gender, or 
sexuality. For example, the draft accommodation proposal that Wilson, 
Berg, and others, with the support of Laycock and others, have sent to 
states considering legislative exemptions for those who claim a religious 
objection to providing goods and services for or recognition to a same-sex 
marriage, would not only protect the objecting service providers from suit 
by individuals to whom they refuse service or recognition, but would also 
legally guarantee that the refusal will not 
result in any action by the State or any of its subdivisions to penalize or 
withhold benefits from any protected entity or individual, under any laws 
of [the] State or its subdivisions, including but not limited to laws 
regarding employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, 
educational institutions, licensing, government contracts or grants, or 
tax-exempt status.49 
This not only seeks to make discrimination as costless as possible for 
the religious, but would also deny to those states and their subdivisions 
committed to guaranteeing liberty and equality with respect to sex, gender, 
and sexuality the ability to vindicate these commitments, even in their 
 
 49. See, e.g. Letter from Wilson et al, supra note 2, at 5. A similar provision designed to allow 
continued unfettered access to government subsidies and contracts on the part of religious employers 
who chose to discriminate against LGBT employees was inserted at the last minute into the version of 
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”) referred by the Senate to the House in 2013. See 
S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6(b) (2013). See also Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal 
Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1375–77 (2014) (discussing legislative 
proposals to broaden ENDA’s already-broad religious exemptions). 
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choice of contracting partners and subsidy recipients. What then remains of 
the promise of letting not only religious conservatives, but also those with 
liberal egalitarian commitments in matters of sexuality and gender “live 
their own values”? What remains of a space in which they, too, can have 
their “rules control”? 
Most of the proponents of live-and-let-live seem to treat any refusal to 
recognize, include, or subsidize religious opponents of sexual liberty and 
equality as unjustifiable discrimination against these religious opponents, 
rather than as merely an attempt by proponents of sexual equality and 
liberty to maintain a space in which to live their own values. In the name of 
living-and-letting-live, for example, many express indignation rather than 
support for the result in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,50 even though 
all Hastings College of the Law sought to withhold in that case from a 
campus group that excluded some students on the basis of religion and 
sexual orientation was official recognition and subsidies, not categorically 
the ability to meet or advertise on campus.51 In the name of living-and-
letting-live, many similarly complain of and would seek to reverse, through 
legislatively mandated accommodations and exemptions, the results in 
cases such as those involving Ocean Grove Camp Meeting in New Jersey,52 
Catholic Charities in Illinois,53 and the Boy Scouts in Connecticut,54 
although, in each of these cases, the harm suffered by the religious 
organization in question was simply its inability to benefit from certain 
 
 50. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 
561 U.S. 661 (2010) (upholding policy of a state-sponsored law school of only giving official 
recognition to student groups that agreed to admit “all comers” and not exclude students based on 
forbidden grounds including religion and sexual orientation). 
 51. Id. at 671–73. For an example of the hostile reaction of live-and-let-live proponents to the 
result in Christian Legal Society, see, for example Laycock, Free Exercise, supra note 1, at 428–29 
(arguing that the Court should have held there was a “free speech problem” with the rules applied in 
Christian Legal Society); Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 868–69 (mocking the notion that “a 
student religious group’s statement of faith is religious discrimination” ). 
 52. See Jill P. Capuzzo, Group Loses Tax Break Over Gay Union Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
2007, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/18/nyregion/18grove.html (reporting that a 
beachfront pavilion associated with the Methodist Church, which had been granted a tax exemption on 
condition that it be open to the public, violated this condition and forfeited the exemption when it 
declined to allow a same-sex couple to hold a commitment ceremony on the premises).  
 53. See Summary Judgment Order at 2, 3, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield v. 
State, No. 2011-MR-254 (Sangamon Cnty., Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug 18, 2011), 2011 WL 3655016 (“The fact 
that [Catholic Charities] has contracted with the State to provide care and adoption services for over 
forty years does not vest [Catholic Charities] with a protected property interest. . . . No citizen has a 
recognized legal right to a contract with the government.”) 
 54. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting Boy Scouts’ 
First Amendment challenge to its exclusion from Connecticut’s employee charitable contributions 
campaign on account of its discriminatory policies against gays). 
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government subsidies or government contracts so long as it refused to abide 
by the nondiscrimination conditions placed on the contracts and subsidies 
by the government entities paying for them, which were themselves 
committed to a policy of nondiscrimination. 
Finally, the accommodations and exemptions now being sought by 
religious conservatives in the sexual culture wars are vastly more expansive 
than the paradigm cases of religious accommodation in U.S. law to which 
proponents of granting such exemptions under the banner of live-and-let-
live seek to assimilate them, notably the exemption of pacifist Quakers 
from the draft and of Catholic hospitals from performing nontherapeutic 
abortions. 
Perhaps the best way of illustrating just how far from “honor[ing] 
America’s . . . long and rich tradition of religious freedom”55 granting these 
expansive new claims for exemption would be is to examine these new 
claims in light of Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s concurring opinion in a case 
that should be far more prominent than it is in discussions of religious 
accommodation. In Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California,56 
the Supreme Court unanimously declined to grant a religious exemption 
from a required course in military science and tactics to pacifist Methodist 
students at a state-sponsored school. Justice Cardozo began his analysis of 
why the case involves no “obstruction by the state to ‘the free exercise’ of 
religion as the phrase was understood by the founders of the nation, and by 
the generations that have followed” by observing: 
 
 55. Letter from Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 1. In this and their other letters urging legislative 
exemptions for religious opponents of same-sex marriage, Wilson et al. claim that it is part of the 
American tradition of religious liberty that accommodations should “serve the purpose of insulating 
conscientious objectors from penalties at the hands of the government.” They then treat as the sort of 
penalty from which conscientious objectors ought to be insulated any refusal by government to exempt 
the objector from generally applicable conditions on government subsidies or contracts. Id. at 13. Do 
they therefore see the result and the reasoning in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 
see infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text, as contrary to the American tradition of religious liberty? 
 56. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); id. at 265–68 (Cardozo, J., 
concurring). The Cardozo concurrence in Hamilton is not the only opinion by a highly-regarded Justice 
concerning religious freedom that I wish had not fallen so far out of the canon. See also Douglas v. City 
of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 180, 181–82 (1943) (Jackson, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Religious freedom in the long run does not come from this kind of license to each sect to fix its own 
limits, but comes of hardheaded fixing of those limits by neutral authority with an eye to the widest 
freedom to proselyte compatible with the freedom of those subject to proselyting pressures. . . . This 
Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of 
collapsing when one story too many is added. So it was with liberty of contract, which was discredited 
by being overdone. The Court is adding a new privilege to override the rights of others to what has 
before been regarded as religious liberty.”). 
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The petitioners have not been required to bear arms for any hostile 
purpose, offensive or defensive, either now or in the future. They have 
not even been required in any absolute or peremptory way to join in 
courses of instruction that will fit them to bear arms. If they elect to 
resort to an institution for higher education maintained with the state’s 
moneys, then and only then they are commanded to follow courses of 
instruction believed by the state to be vital to its welfare. This may be 
condemned by some as unwise or illiberal or unfair when there is 
violence to conscientious scruples, either religious or merely ethical. 
More must be shown to set the ordinance at naught.57 
Justice Cardozo went on to note that, while “[f]rom the beginnings of 
our history, Quakers and other conscientious objectors have been 
exempted . . . from military service,” this was not only a mere “act of 
grace,” but also “the exemption, when granted, ha[d] been coupled with a 
condition, at least in many instances, that they supply the army with a 
substitute or with the money necessary to hire one.”58 
These specific points are illuminating enough when translated to the 
present situation. As Justice Cardozo makes clear, the history of free 
exercise in America demonstrates that a religious accommodation, even 
when granted, need not be costless to those who receive it, and that 
conditioning state subsidies on compliance with state policies does not 
violate the religious liberty of those who choose to avail themselves of the 
subsidy. He goes on to speak more generally: 
Never in our history has the notion been accepted, or even, it is believed, 
advanced, that acts thus indirectly related to service in the camp or field 
are so tied to the practice of religion as to be exempt, in law or in morals, 
from regulation by the state. . . . 
 Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have 
never yet been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties 
were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance 
of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or in furtherance of any other 
end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of 
private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and the 
compulsion of the agencies of government. One who is a martyr to a 
 
 57. Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 265–66 (Cardozo, J. concurring). Justice Cardozo’s concurrence was 
joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone. Id.at 268. 
 58. Id. at 266. See generally Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil 
Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (2014) (describing the consensus in the World War I era 
among policymakers and advocates that those excused from the military draft because of conscientious 
objection to fighting in war would nevertheless be obligated to perform alternative noncombatant or 
civil service). 
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principle—which may turn out in the end to be a delusion or an error—
does not prove by his martyrdom that he has kept within the law.59 
As I see it, every point Cardozo makes about the claims of the 
plaintiffs in Hamilton is true a fortiori of the new proposals for religious 
exemption now championed in the context of the sexual culture wars. 
Having set forth in general terms my concerns about the viability a live-
and-let-live approach to religious accommodation in the sexual culture 
wars, I will now examine a few of the many serious problems in more 
detail. One overarching theme of the problems I shall discuss is that of an 
asymmetry I’m tempted to call “live-and-let-die.”60 The proponents of 
living-and-letting-live disregard (or in some instance actively embrace) 
extremely troubling asymmetries: (1) in the accommodation sought to be 
granted to religious opponents of sexual civil rights as compared with that 
offered to religious opponents of almost anything else that secular law 
requires or protects; (2) in the space sought to be granted to religious 
opponents of sexual civil rights and those they would offer to proponents of 
those rights; and (3) in the harms suffered by religious objectors seeking 
accommodation and the harms suffered by those whom they would be 
excused from serving, including, or treating equally. 
As I have previously observed, what helped the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses work so well together to maintain religious peace 
and freedom for so long was that, fortunately, as concerns free exercise, 
“most of the deepest disagreements between major religious groups in the 
United States in prior centuries happened to be about what to believe and 
how to worship rather than how to live in society.”61 One major exception, 
 
 59. Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 267–68. 
 60. Cf. Paul McCartney & Wings, Live and Let Die, on LIVE AND LET DIE (United Artists 
Records 1973) (“You used to say live and let live / (you know you did . . .) / But if this ever-changing 
world in which we’re living / Makes you give in and cry / Say live and let die . . . / What does it matter 
to ya / When you got a job to do / You gotta do it well / You gotta give the other fellow hell.”). Literally 
to “give the other fellow hell,” at least if s/he does not repent, remains the expectation of many 
conservative religious combatants in the “ever-changing world” of the sexual culture wars. 
 61. Case, A Lot To Ask, supra note 11, at 108. Similarly, the vast majority of the disputes 
involving the scope of the Free Exercise Clause brought before the Supreme Court in the past hundred 
years have, been directly or indirectly about how to worship. These include: (1) the Sunday closing 
laws cases, see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws against 
challenge by observant Jewish shopkeepers); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (mandating 
unemployment benefits for employee fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath when the law 
accommodated those for whom Sunday was the religiously mandated day of rest); (2) cases about the 
sacramental use of controlled substances, see Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting Native Americans’ free exercise claim for an exemption from a state law that 
withheld unemployment benefits from persons fired for misconduct, when the misconduct alleged was 
related to the sacramental use of the drug peyote); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
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the Mormon practice of polygamy, was not in fact accommodated, but 
promptly and harshly quashed, as Justice Scalia noted in his Romer v. 
Evans dissent.62 As the outcomes in Reynolds and Smith demonstrate, 
accommodating religiously motivated differences in how to live has always 
been much more difficult and less readily attainable than accommodating 
differences about what to believe. The problems of accommodating 
religious differences about how to live in society, such as those at issue in 
the sexual culture wars, are compounded in present-day America, not only 
by the increasing diversity of religious views about how to live, but also by 
the increasingly interconnected way groups and individuals do in fact live. 
Moreover, in contradistinction to most of the exemption claims put forward 
in the context of sexual rights, earlier free exercise claims such as those in 
Reynolds and Smith involved efforts on the part of believers to engage in 
 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (after Congress’s enactment of RFRA in response to Smith, see supra 
note 21 and accompanying text, granting legislative exemption from drug laws to religiously motivated 
users of hoasca, an hallucinogenic tea); (3) cases involving impediments to worship faced by prisoners, 
see O’Lone v. Shabbaz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (rejecting Muslim inmates’ free exercise challenge to state 
prison policies they claimed prevented them from attending religious services), Native Americans, see 
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that the Free Exercise 
Clause does not prohibit the Government from granting timber harvesting rights on land central to 
Native American religious practices), and Santeria, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialea, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking down portion of municipal ordinance prohibiting ritual animal 
sacrifice as practiced by Santerians ); and (4) even the RFRA case City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997) (concerning a zoning dispute about the architecture of a church). The two major cases in 
which a religious liberty claim clearly extending beyond worship was vindicated are Thomas v. Review 
Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (extending unemployment benefits to an employee who lost his job 
because of a religiously motivated refusal to work on the production of armaments), and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (providing an exemption from a compulsory school attendance law for 
Amish children), which are also seen by most scholars as outliers and by many as problematic.  
  To make this descriptive observation is not at all to claim that religion should be or is 
confined to belief and worship. Of course, many devout believers incorporate their faith into every 
aspect of their lives, but, let me repeat what I said previously: in my view, the Reynolds Court had it 
right that this cannot make the religious laws unto themselves. See supra notes 22–23 and 
accompanying text. 
 62. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648–51 (1996) (Scalia J. dissenting) (drawing analogies 
between condemnation of polygamy in the nineteenth century and condemnation of homosexuality in 
the twentieth and observing the numerous respects in which the Supreme Court had found it to be 
constitutional to make criminal and otherwise legally disadvantage the religiously motivated conduct of 
polygamists). A more minor exception, the use of controlled mind-altering drugs in religious ritual, was 
held by the Supreme Court not to require a religious exemption from a general law making use of such 
drugs illegal. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–82, 890. As noted supra note 61, because it involved the 
sacramental use of controlled substances, Smith is also a dispute about how to worship, but the 
particular form of worship also quite directly involves a contested way of living in society, as would, to 
an even greater degree, claims for freedom of worship involving human sacrifice. This is a familiar 
issue in free speech cases—all speech is also noise; all press, at least before the computer age, is also 
litter. Just as government is not categorically barred from regulating noise because it takes the form of 
words, it is not categorically barred from regulating actions because believers invest them with religious 
significance. For further discussion see Case, supra note 42.  
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primary religiously mandated conduct, rather than efforts to avoid being 
complicit with, tainted by or implicated in the religiously condemned 
conduct of others.63 In these and many other respects, claims for exemption 
made in the context of the current “national conversation on political and 
cultural issues related to sexuality”64 extend well beyond what was even 
claimed by, let alone granted to, earlier religious conscientious objectors to 
secular law.65 
Proponents of live-and-let-live have also yet to come to terms with the 
fact that issues of sexual rights are far from the only issues about how to 
live in society as to which there is strong religiously motivated objection by 
some to the lives and actions of others.66 They need to clarify the extent to 
which their proposed framework should be, or the reasons why it should 
not be, applied to any of these other issues. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
pointed out in her Hobby Lobby dissent, even if one limits the field of 
inquiry only to the very narrow question of religiously motivated 
objections to aspects of the provision of health care coverage, there are 
“religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s 
Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from 
pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin 
(certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian 
Scientists, among others),” each of which must either be accorded the same 
deference granted to religiously motivated objections to the contraceptive 
 
 63. A discussion of the implications and limits of this distinction is far beyond the scope of this 
Essay. In raising it here, I do not mean to suggest that avoiding contamination by or cooperation, 
however remote, with what one’s faith sees as evil cannot be equally important to believers as 
themselves refraining from the relevant evil acts. I am simply highlighting once again the extent to 
which claims for accommodation in the sexual rights context are, if not entirely unprecedented, 
importantly different from most earlier claims for religious accommodation. 
 64. Letter from Dr. Joel C. Hunter et al., Senior Pastor, Northland, A Church Distributed, to 
President Barack Obama 1 (July 1, 2014), http://www.scribd.com/doc/232327567/Religious-
Exemption_Letter_to_President_Obama#scribd. 
 65. I do not deny that many of the claims made by proponents of sexual rights are similarly 
unprecedented and that questions about their generalizability remain as yet unanswered. See, e.g., Case, 
A Lot To Ask, supra note 11, at 108 (asking, in the context of Justice Scalia’s discussion of special 
rights in his Romer dissent and Martha Nussbaum’s defense of gay rights, “If it is permissible for 
people to lose jobs on account of their sexual promiscuity or celibacy, let alone their vegetarianism or 
libertarianism, why not for their homosexual practices?”); Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in 
Lawrence v Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 112–14 (comparing employment discrimination against gays 
and lesbians with employment discrimination against those engaged in other disfavored sexual 
practices). 
 66. As Justice Ginsburg put it in her Hobby Lobby dissent, “Hobby Lobby and Conestoga surely 
do not stand alone as commercial enterprises seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws on the 
basis of their religious beliefs.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2804 (Ginsburg, 
J. dissenting). 
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mandate or adequately distinguished.67 Broadening the horizon, Justice 
Ginsburg also enumerated just a few of the many “commercial enterprises 
[in addition to Hobby Lobby] seeking exemptions from generally 
applicable laws on the basis of their religious beliefs,” citing already 
litigated cases in which enterprises objected to dealing with blacks, 
unmarried heterosexual cohabitants, “young, single wom[e]n working 
without [their] father’s consent,” “married wom[e]n working without 
[their] husband’s consent,” and any person “antagonistic to the Bible,” 
including “fornicators and homosexuals.”68 She asked, “Would RFRA 
require exemptions in cases of this ilk? And if not, how does the Court 
divine which religious beliefs are worthy of accommodation, and which are 
not? Isn’t the Court disarmed from making such a judgment . . . ?”69 
Similarly, I warned in 2009 that even if, arguendo, the proponents of 
live-and-let-live are right going forward about the small number of likely 
exemption claims arising from same-sex marriage and related gay rights 
issues (an assumption about which I will raise questions below) “[t]here is 
every reason to think that” a multiplicity of other analogous “religious 
exemptions will . . . often be sought. A glance at the docket of a single 
federal judge, my colleague Frank Easterbrook, gives some sense of the 
range of already litigated cases on such issues.”70 Religious opposition to 
gay people was involved in some of Judge Easterbrook’s public 
employment cases; for example, the case of a cosmetology instructor who 
persisted in proselytizing students in her clinic,71 but he also was faced 
with the complaints of a Roman Catholic FBI agent who refused on 
religious grounds to investigate peaceful anti-war protestors,72 a Baptist 
police officer who refused on religious grounds to accept an assignment at 
a casino,73 a Black Muslim prisoner who refused on religious grounds, 
while on kitchen duty, to clean pork off food trays,74 and a Christian 
prisoner who objected on religious grounds to being exposed to observation 
 
 67. Id. at 2805 
 68. Id. at 2804–05 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Id. at 2805. 
 70. Memo to Koppelman and Dent, supra note 12, at 5 (alterations in original). The ensuing 
discussion builds on the 2009 response to Koppelman and Dent. 
 71. Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2006) (opinion of Wood, J.) 
From Piggee’s student evaluations it appears that not only gay students, but also other students whose 
“religion is inferior to hers” were likely to be told in class that “she was going to get that devil out of” 
them. Id. at 672. 
 72. Ryan v.DOJ, 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 73. Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 74. Chapman v. Pickett, 801 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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by female guards.75 
Holding that the Baptist policeman, just like the Catholic FBI Agent, 
was not entitled to the requested religious accommodation and could be 
fired, Easterbrook observed: 
Many officers have religious scruples about particular activities . . . . If 
[plaintiff] is right, all of these faiths, and more, must be accommodated 
by assigning believers to duties compatible with their principles. Does 
§ 701(j) [mandating religious accommodation] require the State Police to 
assign Unitarians to guard the abortion clinic, Catholics to prevent thefts 
from liquor stores, and Baptists to investigate claims that supermarkets 
mis-weigh bacon and shellfish? Must prostitutes be left exposed to 
slavery or murder at the hands of pimps because protecting them from 
crime would encourage them to ply their trade and thus offend almost 
every religious faith? 
. . . . 
Firefighters must extinguish all fires, even those in places of worship that 
the firefighter regards as heretical.76 
Looking beyond one judge’s cases, to the newspaper headlines, would 
multiply the potential claims for exemption a thousandfold. For example, 
when it first hit the headlines that Muslim cab drivers at the Minneapolis-
St. Paul Airport would not serve passengers carrying duty-free 
liquor, “officials of the Metropolitan Airports Commission proposed color-
coded lights on cab roofs to indicate whether the driver would accept a 
passenger carrying alcohol.”77 After more than 5,000 documented taxi 
refusals at the airport and countless more passengers involuntarily dropped 
off somewhere between the airport and their destination as soon it became 
clear to their driver that they were carrying alcohol, authorities dropped all 
talk of a religious exemption and instead upped the penalty for refusal from 
being sent to the end of the cab line to a thirty-day taxi license suspension 
for a first offense and a two-year taxi license revocation for a second 
offense.78 Twin Cities Muslim cab drivers also repeatedly refused to carry 
passengers with dogs, including seeing-eye dogs.79 The overwhelming 
majority of cabbies in the airport area are Somali Muslims and there is 
 
 75. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 76. Endres, 349 F.3d at 925, 927. 
 77. Katherine Kersten, A Two-Tiered Airport Taxi System Could Lead to ‘Chapter Two’, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.startribune.com/local/11585696.html (discussing 
new penalties in Minnesota for cab drivers who refuse to transport certain passengers). 
 78. See Minnesota's Muslim Cab Drivers Face Crackdown, REUTERS, (Apr. 17, 2007) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/17/us-muslims-taxis-idUSN1633289220070417. 
 79. Also, “Muslim taxi drivers have repeatedly refused to transport Paula Hare, who is 
transgendered, [according to] KMSP-TV, Channel 9.” Kersten, supra note 77. 
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every reason to think offering a religious exemption to such drivers would 
serve to increase the number who insist on one, because failure to insist on 
one will mark the driver in the eyes of the community as a bad Muslim.80 
(Compare, here, the argument that civil rights laws mandating that blacks 
be served by businesses in the South solved the collective action problem 
faced by business owners pressured by their white racist customers to 
remain segregated.) Advocates of exemptions from public accommodation 
laws for service providers who refuse to provide flowers or cake for same-
sex wedding celebrations have yet to explain whether and why the claims 
of these Christian bakers and florists are more worthy of accommodation 
than those of Minneapolis’s Muslim cab drivers, who also wish to avoid 
“cooperating in sin.”81 
Some proponents of religious exemptions in the context of the sexual 
culture wars have also suggested that the state should be foreclosed from 
requiring public employees to participate in diversity training classes82 or 
from telling students of social work that it is “simply not acceptable for 
social workers to view homosexual people as perverse.”83 This too, opens 
up the possibility of a host of analogous religious accommodation claims 
going far beyond gay rights. Would the same analysis apply to a school 
 
 80. See, e.g., Katherine Kersten, Shariah in Minnesota?, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 24, 2007), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117470053320547681 ( “Islam prohibits the consumption of alcohol 
but not its transportation, say Somalis who reject the taxi drivers’ stance. Yet in June 2006, the Muslim 
American Society’s . . . Minnesota chapter issued a ‘fatwa’ forbidding drivers here from carrying 
alcohol to avoid ‘cooperating in sin.’ Hassan Mohamud, one of the fatwa signers, praised the two top-
light proposal as a national model for accommodating Islam in areas ranging from housing to the 
workplace. But according to Omar Jamal of the Somali Justice Advocacy Center in St. Paul, [the group] 
is ‘trying to hijack and radicalize the Somali community for their Middle East agenda.’”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Freedom, 95 
KY. L.J. 553, 585 (2006–2007) (citing and discussing Altman v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 251 F.3d 1199 
(8th Cir. 2001)). Note that the draft legislation proposed by Wilson et al. and endorsed by Laycock et 
al., would exempt any “individual” from “provid[ing] counseling or other services that directly facilitate 
the perpetuation of any marriage” or from being liable to any “civil cause of action or other penalties” 
on account of such refusal. Letter from Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 4; Letter from Laycock et al., 
supra note 2. As will be discussed infra, it remains unclear whether the effect of this legislation, if 
enacted, would be to prevent a public (or even a private) employer, from firing or refusing to hire a 
counselor who refused, out of religious objections to same-sex relationships, to counsel some of the 
employer’s patients. Certainly the proponents of the draft legislation intend it to protect counseling 
students from educational disadvantage and counseling professionals from licensing difficulties. 
Laycock, for example, seems to endorse the settlement in Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012), 
under which, as he puts it, a “counseling student . . . expelled for refusing to counsel gays about their 
relationship difficulties . . . settled for a cash payment without being readmitted to the program.” 
Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 850. 
 83. Dent, supra note 82, at 596 (citing Maura Lerner, St. Cloud State’s Department Statement on 
Gays Causes Backlash, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 1, 1993, at 9A). 
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telling students it was training in clinical psychology that it was not 
acceptable for them to view mentally ill people as possessed by demons, 
especially considering that exorcism is still practiced by many traditional 
religions?84 If not, why not? 
Although the first inclination of those arguing for live-and-let-live 
solutions to the sexual culture wars may be to say that addressing any other 
religious exemption questions is beyond the scope of their project, a law 
reform proposal that cannot be generalized to other similar issues is at best 
of limited usefulness, at worst dangerous and unconstitutional. Justice 
Ginsburg is clearly correct to warn, in her Hobby Lobby dissent, of the risk 
of “havoc”85 and the absence of a “stopping point”86 if exemptions are 
granted to all those with claims analogous to those put forth by religious 
opponents of sexual rights. On the other hand, granting exemptions only to 
religious objectors to sexual rights, and not to other similarly situated 
conscientious objectors on other issues could itself raise constitutional 
problems under the federal Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses as 
well as state constitutional provisions such as California’s No Preference 
Clause.87 As Justice Ginsburg also warned in her Hobby Lobby dissent, 
“approving some religious claims while deeming others unworthy of 
accommodation could be ‘perceived as favoring one religion over another,’ 
the very ‘risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.’”88 
It is important to look at the risk of potentially unconstitutional 
favoritism implicit in proposals for special religious accommodations in the 
sexual culture wars from two distinct angles, considering the risk of 
problematic discrimination in both (A) which religious groups and 
viewpoints are deemed worthy of special accommodation and (B) which 
societal groups will be singled out for diminished protection and thus for 
harm by the proposed accommodation. Establishment Clause problems 
arise when a certain group of believers (notably the conservative 
 
 84. Consider that, in 2003, the Bush Justice Department investigated a complaint of religious 
discrimination against a Texas Tech biology professor who declined to write letters of recommendation 
for any student who could not “truthfully and forthrightly affirm a scientific answer” to the question 
“How do you think the human species originated?” Karen Brulliard, In Texas, a Darwinian Debate, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at A07. 
 85. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. at 2802. 
 87. Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution guarantees the “[f]ree exercise and 
enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference,” and has been interpreted “as being broader 
than the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; Vernon v. City of 
L.A., 27 F.3d 1385, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 88. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.,252, 263 n.2 (1982) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
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evangelical Protestants and Catholics who would be the principal 
beneficiaries of religious accommodations in the context of the sexual 
culture wars) is extended accommodation not granted to others with 
analogous claims for accommodation, especially when those denied 
analogous accommodations come from faiths less numerically or culturally 
dominant. The constitutional concerns are compounded when one considers 
not only that the views of certain dominant religious groups are favored for 
accommodation by proponents of live-and-let-live, creating establishment 
clause problems, but also that the brunt of the proposed exemptions will 
fall almost exclusively on individual members of historically disadvantaged 
groups, notably gay men, lesbians and other women, creating equal 
protection problems. The problem here is precisely that which caused the 
Supreme Court to strike down the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) as 
unconstitutional.89 
In addition to potentially opening up the floodgates to a host of new 
potential claims for religious exemption by a host of different kinds of 
service providers who seek to avoid serving a host of different clients for a 
host of different religious reasons, proposals to live-and-let-live, if taken 
seriously, risk upsetting settled law denying religious accommodation to 
those who claim a religious objection to associating with blacks or Jews or 
women on terms of equality. Though few today would seek an exemption 
from dealing with blacks, there is every reason to believe that had such an 
exemption been made available earlier, it not only would have been 
asserted, it might have become entrenched. As William Eskridge has 
documented, the interaction of traditional religions with the black civil 
rights movement in the United States has been dynamic—denied an 
accommodation for the exclusion of blacks, traditional religious groups 
gradually accommodated themselves to their inclusion.90 
Unfortunately, traditional religions have not yet internalized United 
States constitutional norms of sex equality to even a significant fraction of 
the same extent as they have internalized such norms on racial integration 
 
 89. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (striking down DOMA as a 
“[d]iscrimination[] of an unusual character,” targeting for disadvantage and stigma a group the state had 
specifically chosen to protect but which was condemned by the “traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) 
morality” legislators wished to reinforce (first alteration in original)). Similar difficulties led Judge 
Vaughn Walker to strike down California’s Proposition 8, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), and the Supreme Court to strike down Colorado’s Amendment 2, Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
 90. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief, and 
Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 665–85 (2011) (analyzing the 
dynamic relationship of American religious groups to African-American civil rights). 
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in the course of the last half century. Nor, unfortunately, is it likely as a 
matter of fact that judges and legislators would view religious exemptions 
from constitutional and statutory sex equality norms to be quite as far out 
of bounds as exemptions from norms on race,91 as the carefully phrased 
dicta in Justice Samuel Alito’s Hobby Lobby majority opinion confirm.92 
Whether or not there have been or will continue to be few cases in which “a 
right is asserted to discriminate against gay people precisely as such,”93 
there have been an abundance of cases in which on religious grounds, “a 
right is asserted to discriminate against [women] precisely as such.” 
Whether under the Equal Pay Act or Title VII, numerous employers have 
litigated and lost their claim that their religious views justified them in 
refusing to hire or promote women or to pay them equally with men.94 I am 
even more afraid than I was when I first squarely confronted the issue in 
2009 that live-and-let-live proposals risk not only upsetting this settled law 
but also expanding the range of employers who could use religious 
exemptions to discriminate against women. This worries me profoundly 
 
 91. But see generally Case, supra note 16 (arguing that, as a matter of law, an uncompromising 
commitment to the equality of the sexes is incumbent on state actors in the United States, including 
judges and legislators, whenever they act or speak). 
 92. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (majority opinion). Very carefully mentioning only 
race, and not, for example, sex, let alone sexual orientation, Alito insists:  
The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on the 
basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction. Our decision 
today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an 
equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on 
racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.  
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
  Note how the words “for example,” central to Ginsburg’s challenge, drop out of Alito’s 
reassurances, such that only race, but not other forbidden grounds for employment discrimination, are 
announced by the majority to be immune from interference through RFRA. This is just one of many 
ways in which Alito’s opinion in Hobby Lobby is slippery, and calls for careful textual scrutiny to see 
exactly how little he has actually done to answer the dissent’s objections, or indeed, to resolve the 
issues presented by the case. While further discussion is beyond the scope of this Essay, I am of the 
view that the text of Justice Alito’s Hobby Lobby opinion shows that he has not yet understood or 
grown into his role as a Supreme Court Justice. The opinion is that of a clever lawyer seeking not to get 
trapped, not that of a judge whose job, beyond resolving the case before him, is to provide guidance to 
lower court judges, rather than loopholes to advocates, as they deal with the next generation of related 
cases. 
 93. Koppelman & Dent, supra note 1 at 5..  
 94. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1365 
(9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting religious exemption from Title VII claimed by a christian school that wished 
to use “doctrinal beliefs held by the Church . . . that, while the sexes are equal in dignity before God, 
they are differentiated in role. . . . [and] that in any marriage, the husband is the head of the household,” 
to give lesser pay and benefits to female teachers). As previously noted, and as discussed in greater 
detail in Case, supra note 42, the constitutionalization of the ministerial exemption in Hosanna-Tabor 
already vastly expands the protected scope for religiously justified discrimination against women, 
notwithstanding the protections civil rights laws have sought to extend to them. Legislatively granted 
accommodations and exemptions will compound the problem. 
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both as a feminist and as a constitutional lawyer. 
Nor am I reassured by the insistence of proponents of live-and-let-live 
that while religious liberty may be in great peril, women’s rights are secure, 
that there is of course no danger of retrogression on aspects of our current 
law crucial to women’s legal and social equality.95 I am also a 
comparativist and a student of history.96 I look at the women of 
Afghanistan, in modern dress and in the labor force in the mid-twentieth 
century, in burkas and confined to the home as a matter of law by that 
century’s end; and similarly at the women of Iran, Iraq, and Israel,97 to 
name just a few of the other countries in which increasing religious 
demands for sex segregation, for the exclusion of women from the public 
sphere, even for outright female subordination, have gained rather than lost 
traction in law as the result of religious demands in the course of my 
lifetime,98 and I am anything but reassured. I also note that, as members of 
the Hobby Lobby majority have very recently acknowledged, demands for 
religious accommodation are infinitely expandable: in many religions, as a 
matter of religious principle, a believer strives asymptotically to approach 
perfect observance, demanding ever more of him or herself, and 
correspondingly of the state by way of accommodation or exemption from 
laws that stand in the way of more perfect observance.99 This is yet another 
 
 95. Of course, not all the danger comes from claims made in the name of religion. Constitutional 
originalism, as articulated by Justice Scalia, for example, also poses risks, as I discuss in Mary Anne 
Case, The Ladies? Forget About Them. A Feminist Perspective on the Limits of Originalism, 29 CONST. 
COMMENT. 431 (2014). 
 96. Indeed, the job talk that got me my first job in legal academia analyzed exactly such an 
example of retrogression in women’s rights—the fact that French women, who had been voting for the 
Estates General since the time of Philip the Fair in the Middle Ages, and who voted in 1789 on terms 
nearly identical to those of men, lost the franchise entirely in the French Revolution and did not regain 
it until 1946. See generally Mary Anne Case, “La Révolution n’a rien fait pour les pauvres femmes”: 
The Rhetoric and Reality of Political Rights for Women in the French Revolution (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author) (discussing the retrogression in women’s political rights after 
1789). 
 97. See, e.g., ISRAEL RELIGIOUS ACTION CTR., EXCLUDED, FOR GOD’S SAKE: GENDER 
SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC SPACE IN ISRAEL (2010), available at 
http://www.irac.org/userfiles/Excluded,%20For%20God%27s%20Sake%20-
%20Report%20on%20Gender%20Segregation%20in%20the%20Public%20Sphere%20in%20Israel%2
81%29.pdf (describing increasing demands by haredim for segregation of the sexes in Israeli public 
life). 
 98. Retrogression has also happened here in the United States. Again, recall that even the 
Catholic Church itself, in California, was providing contraception and same-sex partner benefits to its 
own employees for decades before the ACA, although it now refuses to do so and the Court seems to be 
backing it up.  
 99. During the oral argument of Holt v. Hobbs, in which Laycock represented a Muslim prisoner 
who successfully sought the accommodation of growing a half-inch beard despite prison rules requiring 
that he shave, Laycock was berated in turn by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice John Roberts. Roberts 
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sense in which there is, as Justice Ginsburg says, no “stopping point.” In 
her Hobby Lobby dissent, Justice Ginsburg asked about the majority’s 
proposed less restrictive alternative of having the government pay directly 
for contraception, “where is the stopping point to the ‘let the government 
pay’ alternative?”100 There is similarly no stopping point with analogous 
claims and no stopping point down the slippery slope to demands to be 
exempt from ever more remote connection with the religiously 
impermissible act.101 Consider the ever expanding reach of persons who 
seek accommodation or exemption due to their conscientious objection to 
participating in abortions—the range of individuals raising such claims has 
expanded from physicians actually performing abortions, to ambulance 
drivers and IV nurses, to pharmacists objecting to dispensing not only the 
morning after pill, but also condoms.102 
 
accused Laycock of  
“really just making your case too easy. I mean, one of the difficult issues in a case like this is 
where to draw the line. And you just say, well, we want to draw the line at half inch because 
that lets us win. And the next day someone's going to be here with one inch. And maybe it'll 
be you. And then, you know, two inches. It seems to me you can't avoid the legal difficulty 
just by saying, all we want is half an inch. 
. . . 
[W]e have to decide this case pursuant to a generally applicable legal principle, and that legal 
principle is one, it seems to me, that demands some sort of a limit. And if you're unwilling to 
articulate a limit to the principle itself, it becomes a little bit difficult to apply it, say, well, we 
don't know what the limit is because you're only asking a half inch. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Holt v. Hobbs , 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (No. 13-6827), 2014 WL 
5398229, at *6–7. 
  Then, Justice Scalia (who, earlier in the argument had insisted that “religious beliefs aren't 
reasonable. I mean, religious beliefs are categorical. You know, it’s God tells you. It's not a matter of 
being reasonable. God be reasonable? He’s supposed to have a full beard.”) suggested that Laycock’s 
reasonable client’s case be dismissed as improvidently granted and the Court wait for a prisoner who 
claimed the right to a full beard because the Court didn’t “want to do these cases half inch by half inch.” 
Id. at 5, 7, 2014 WL at *5, *7. 
 100. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2802 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). She continued: “Suppose an employer's sincerely held religious belief is offended 
by . . . paying the minimum wage, or according women equal pay for substantially similar work? Does 
it rank as a less restrictive alternative to require the government to provide the money . . . to which the 
employer has a religion-based objection? . . . [T]he Court cannot easily answer that question . . . .” Id. 
(citations omitted). 
 101. As I shall be discussing in a forthcoming project, Kol Nidre/All Vows, the problems are 
multiplied yet again when individuals are able fully and freely to specify the precise boundaries of the 
religious obligations they choose to undertake (as did the Greens of Hobby Lobby and as do those 
whose claim for religious exemption is based on a vow) and to have their obligations under secular law 
modified accordingly.  
 102. Cf. OFFICIAL OPINION FROM THE OFFICE OF RICHARD C. TURNER, ATTORNEY GEN. OF IOWA 
9066–67 (Mar. 1, 1976) (answering the question whether language in a proposed law “covering 
participation or refusal to participate in abortion procedures [is] so broad as to cover refusal of the 
hospital pharmacists to make up the saline solution used in abortions; . . . the nurse who refuses to 
attend to the physical comfort and care of the patient in the ward after she has had an abortion[;] . . . [or] 
personnel [who] refuse to serve food to the room of a patient who is in a hospital room for ‘aftercare’ 
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This ever expanding circle of conscientious objectors to the provision 
of various aspects of women’s reproductive health care has had among its 
powerful legal weapons the Church Amendment, which provides: 
No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of 
any part of a health service program or research activity funded in whole 
or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services if his performance or assistance in the performance of 
such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his religious 
beliefs or moral convictions.103 
One way to probe the extent to which proponents of live-and-let-live 
are serious about the symmetry of their assertion that “[i]f we are to 
preserve liberty for both sides in the culture wars, then we have to preserve 
some space where each side can live its own values and where its rules 
control,”104 is to consider what support they would offer to someone who 
sought to mobilize the Church Amendment as a conscientious objector 
against the values of traditional conservative religion in the sexual culture 
wars. Note that the Church Amendment on its face protects persons 
motivated not only by “religious beliefs” but also by “moral convictions.” I 
myself have a profound moral conviction that no child, but especially not a 
girl child, should be born into a family in which women are systematically 
subordinated to men and forced into traditional sex-roles.105 As noted 
above, I have previously called this moral conviction feminist 
fundamentalism, defined as an uncompromising commitment to the 
equality of the sexes and the abolition of fixed sex roles.106  If I were an 
obstetrician-gynecologist, would I be fully accommodated in a refusal to 
provide services that would facilitate the reproduction of a Quiverful 
family or an FLDS family or a woman who came to my office in a burka 
with a husband who did all the talking for her? Would the supporters of 
live-and-let-live be as eager to defend me as they are to defend religiously 
motivated conscientious objectors to the provision of contraceptives? 
I could ask similar questions with respect to any of the proposals for 
 
following an abortion” as follows: “In construing language of this sort, a rational, reasonable and 
sensible approach has to be taken. If it were otherwise, one could eventually get to the point where the 
man who mines the iron ore that goes to make the steel, which is used by a factory to make instruments 
used in abortions could refuse to work on conscientious grounds. Reductio ad absurdum.”). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (2012). 
 104. Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 1, at 839 (emphasis added). 
 105. For further discussion, see generally Feminist Fundamentalism and Constitutional 
Citizenship, supra note 11 (describing an uncompromising commitment to sex equality and the 
abolition of fixed sex roles). 
 106. I have set forth some of the ways in which I am prepared, if necessary, to be a martyr to this 
moral conviction in Feminist Fundamentalism and Constitutional Citizenship, supra note 11. 
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accommodation and exemption proponents of live-and-let-live urge be 
passed in connection with state recognition of same-sex marriages..First, let 
me observe that the legislation proposed by Wilson et al. and endorsed by 
Laycock et al. speaks very generally, extending exemptions to individuals 
and institutions whose “sincerely held religious beliefs” would be 
“violate[d]” by their “provid[ing] services, accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization or 
celebration of any marriage” or by “treat[ing] as valid any marriage” or by 
“provid[ing] counseling or other services that directly facilitate the 
perpetuation of any marriage.”107 This would on its face extend exemptions 
to those (and there are many) with a sincere religious objection to 
facilitating or recognizing interfaith marriages, the remarriage of the 
divorced,108 even interracial marriages.109  When one adds in the objections 
those with a faith in egalitarian marriage may have to marriages in which 
wives are subordinate to their husbands, very few couples could remain 
secure that their marriage will be recognized as necessary by all those from 
whom they may require services in the course of their married lives.  
Far from promoting the social peace proponents of “live-and-let-live” 
solutions to the sexual culture wars,claim to offer, such a broad license to 
disrespect the validity of such a broad array of potentially disfavored 
marriages seems to encourage insecurity on the part of those in need of 
services and hostility on the part of providers. It moves us farther along the 
road to what I call the new feudalism,110 rather than promoting the liberty 
and equality of all. 
 
 
 107. Letter from Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 3–4 (emphasis added). 
 108. Officially, the Roman Catholic faith also has a sincere religious objection to the marriage of 
those physiologically incapable of vaginal intercourse, including those rendered impotent through, for 
example quadriplegia, see 1983 CODE c.1084, § 1, available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
archive/ENG1104/_P3Y.HTM. (“Antecedent and perpetual impotence to have intercourse, whether on 
the part of the man or the woman, whether absolute or relative, nullifies marriage by its very nature.”). 
 109. See e.g., Melinda Deslatte, Resignation of Justice Who Refused to Marry Interracial Couple 
'Long ‘Overdue,' Jindal Says, Associated Press (Nov. 04, 2009), 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2009/11/resignation_of_tangipahoa_just.html (describing 
resignation of elected justice of the peace who had refused to marry interracial couples out of concern 
that their children might suffer lack of acceptance). 
 110. See Mary Anne Case, The New Feudalism, Keynote Address at the Tulane Law School 
Forum on Law and Inequality (Nov. 7, 2014) (discussing the extent to which our rights risk becoming 
more and more, rather than less and less, a function of our hierarchical attachments, whether to state, 
church, employer, or family). 
 
